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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive... there is no need for
it also to be psychologically injurious." 1d. Determining that the
indices of an abusive work environment claim are case specific,
the Court listed several factors to
consider including the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct, its
severity, whether it was physically
threatening or humiliating, and
whether it unreasonably interfered
with an employee's work performance. Id.
Although the district court
found that Forklift's work environment was not abusive and Harris was not subjectively affected by
the work environment, the Court
felt that the district court's reliance
on the incorrect standard may have
influenced its determination. Id.

This was supported by the fact that
the district court reached this conclusion only after finding that Harris suffered no psychological injury. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Justice Scalia, in a concurring
opinion, bemoaned the vague "abusiveness" standard and the potential litigation it would produce especially since a plaintiff need not
demonstrate any injury. Id. at 372.
Nonetheless, Scalia admitted that
due to the vague statutory language of Title VII, the majority's
standard was the only apparent
alternative. Justice Ginsburg, in a
separate concurring opinion, asserted that the inquiry should focus
on whether the discriminatory con-

duct unreasonably interfered with
theplaintiff's ability to perform his
or her job. id.
In Harris,the Supreme Court
corrected a misinterpretation of the
Meritor standard by the federal
courts in abusive work environment cases. No longer can a court
require a showing ofpsychological
harm as a prerequisite to a claim
for sexual harassment. By so holding, the Court has removed a major
obstacle to plaintiffs seeking redress for such claims. Thus, Harris advances one of Title VII's
main purposes: to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex with
respect to the terms and conditions
of employment.

Florence County School
Dist Four v. Carter:

Rejecting a school district's
claims that the selected private
school was not approved by the
state and that reimbursement would
be too burdensome, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision,
-held that a child's parents are not
barred from reimbursement because of non-compliance with the
Individuals with Disabilities Act
("IDEA"), 84 Stat. 175, as
amended,20U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)
(1988 & Supp. IV). Florence
County School Dist. Four v.
Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
Consequently, the Court declared
that 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) does
not apply to placements of children
in private schools by their parents.
Shannon Carter was classified
as learning disabled in 1985 while
attending a school as a ninth grade
student in Florence County School
District Four. Shannon's parents
("the Carters") met with school

officials to develop an individualized education program ("IEP"),
as required under IDEA.
Shannon's parents were dissatisfied with the IEP that was formulated and requested a hearing to
challenge its appropriateness.
Authorities on both the local and
state levels rejected the parents'
claim and concluded that the IEP
was adequate. In September 1985,
the Carters, without state approval,
enrolled Shannon at the Trident
Academy, a private school, from
which she ultimately graduated in
the spring of 1988.
The Carters filed suit in July
1986, claiming that the school district breached its duty under 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)by failingto
provide Shannon with a "'free appropriate public education."' Id.
at 364 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(18) (1988 & Supp. IV)).
Shannon's parents also sought re-
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imbursement for tuition and other
costs incurred by Shannon's attendance at Trident. The district court
ruled in favor of the Carters, holding that the school district's IEP
was inadequate and that the education Shannon received at Trident
substantially complied with the requirements of IDEA. The district
court concluded that Shannon's
parents were entitled to reimbursement of the costs they incurred in
sending Shannon to Trident. Id.
"The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuitaffirmed." Id. The
court agreed that the school
district's IEP was inappropriate,
and rejected the district's argument that reimbursement is not
proper when the parents choose a
private school not approved by the
state. Id. This ruling knowingly
contradicted an earlier decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court held that
parental placement of a child in a
private school is not proper under
IDEA unless the school is stateapproved. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to resolve this
conflict among the [c]ourts of
[a]ppeals." Id.
The Supreme Court, atthe start
of its analysis, determined that two
issues were settled. First, the school
district's IEP was inappropriate
under IDEA. Second, although
Trident did not fully comply with
the requirements of 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(18), the education provided to Shannon by Trident was
otherwise proper under IDEA. Id.
at 365. The Court stated that the
question to be resolved was whether
the Carters were entitled to reimbursement even though Trident
"did not meet the [20 U.S.C.] §
1401(a)(18) definition of a 'free
appropriate public education."' Id.
The Court statedthat 20 U. S.C.
§ 1401 (a)(1 8)(A) requires that the
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public pay for and supervise education. In addition, the Court found
that 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D)
requires that IEP's "be designed
'by a representative of the local
education agency."' Id. (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D)(1988
& Supp. V)). The Supreme Court
determined that these requirements
do not make sense with regard to
parental placements. The Court
indicated that the reason the Carters placed Shannon at Trident was
because they disagreed with the
school district's IEP. The Court
further indicated that where private placement has been made over
the school district's objection, "the
private school education will not
be under 'public supervision and
direction."' Id. (quoting20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(18)(A) (1988 & Supp.
IV)). The Supreme Court stated
that by applying 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(18) to parental placements, the parents' right to unilaterally remove a child from a public
school would be effectively eliminated. Id.
The Court next explained that
a private school's failure to meet
state education requirements also
does not bar reimbursement. Noting that the school district's emphasis on state standards was ironic
given that the reason Shannon was
removed from the public school
was because the school's IEP was
inadequate, the Court stated that it
disagreed with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and
emphasized that choosing a private school that was not approved
by the state was "not itself a bar to
reimbursement." Id. at 365-66.
The Court concluded its decision by rejecting the school
district's argument that allowing
reimbursement when parents
choose any private school that provides an adequate education under

IDEA will prove to be too costly.
Essentially, the Court found that
the financial burden on states and
school districts that participate
under IDEA was significant. Id. at
366. However, the Court indicated
that reimbursements can be avoided
by either "giv[ing] the child a free
appropriate public education in a
public setting, or plac[ing] the child
in an appropriate private setting of
the [s]tate's choice." Id. Finally,
the Supreme Court emphasized that
parents who unilaterally place a
child in a private school while the
review proceedings are pending,
and without the consent of school
officials, do so at their own financial risk. The Court stated that
parents are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court decides
"that the public placement violated IDEA, and that the private
school placement was proper under the Act." Id.
In summary, parents who unilaterally withdraw a child from a
public school that provides an inappropriate education under IDEA
and place the child in a private
school that does not fully comply
with the requirements under 20
U.S.C. § 1401 (a)(18), but is otherwise proper under IDEA, may be
reimbursed for the cost. In so
holding, the Court took a step to
improve the welfare of learning
disabled children. This decision
means that the parents of a learning
disabled child, who cannot otherwise afford private education, may
no longer be completely atthe mercy
of the public educational system.
Parents who feel that their only
alternative is to place their child in
a private school stand a chance at
being awarded the cost of the private education by a federal court.
- Paul Mantell

